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NOTES
MARITAL PROPERTY AGREEMENTS -BEING CREATIVE
WITH THE NEW LEGISLATION
Although the legislature's recent alteration of the treatment of
matrimonial agreements undoubtedly has made their use more attrac-
tive to contemporary spouses, the concept of property division by
marital contract is hardly a new one. The practice appears to have
been fixed as early as the fourteenth century;' lawyers initiated the
practice in an effort to protect and regulate "the rights of spouses
that might otherwise have suffered in the confusion created by the
numerous Customs of that realm."' Reflecting this ancient tradition,
the Louisiana Civil Code always has had elaborate provisions concern-
ing marriage contracts and dowry,3 but these institutions were used
rarely after the late 1800's. When they were used, it was primarily
by mature persons of means who were contemplating a second mar-
riage and wanted to contract a regime of separation of property
Matrimonial agreements are useful tools which, in some instances,
can provide for a more equitable division of property between the
spouses than that provided by the legal regime. A couple may con-
tract to modify the community property regime by increasing or
decreasing the sharing of assets and liabilities, by providing for sole
management in specific situations, and by waiving reimbursement
rights upon termination of the regime. Conversely, a couple may want
to contract the separation of property regime provided for in the Civil
Code,5 or they may want to modify that regime in order to provide
for a regime which in operation is similar to the old "head and master"
regime. This note will examine some of the problems in the new
legislation concerning matrimonial agreements and some ways to avoid
these problems by contracting a regime responsive to the needs of
the parties.
Copyright, 1982 by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. See Dart, Marriage Contracts of French Colonial Louisiana, 17 LA. HIST. Q. 229,
232 (1934).
2. Id.
3. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2325-2335, 2337-2382, 2392-2396 & 2424, repealed by 1979 La.
Acts, No. 709, S 1.
4. It has been reported that a sampling of parish records in Louisiana reveals
that the use of marriage contracts, except in rare and scattered instances, had
ceased by 1880. It appears that in one parish where French influences remain
relatively strong, the custom of registering an inmentory of the property of the
prospective husband and wife has persisted to some extent.
Morrow, Matrimonial Property Law in Louisiana, 34 TUL. L. REV. 3, 11 (1959) (foot-
note omitted).
5. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2370-2376.
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Definition
The first problem that arises in the new legislation is defining
matrimonial agreement. According to the Civil Code, a matrimonial
regime is a "system of principles and rules governing the ownership
and management of the property of married persons as between
themselves and toward third persons"6 and a matrimonial agreement
is a contract establishing a "regime of separation of property or
modifying or terminating the legal regime."' Prior to the recent
changes, the Civil Code allowed only antenuptial alteration of the legal
regime; this conventional modification was denominated a "marriage
contract."8 The 1979 revision of the matrimonial regime articles,9 which
allows modifications both prior to and during marriage, uses the term
"matrimonial agreement."1 Civil Code articles 1734 through 1755,
which concern, in part, donations between spouses and donations
between those persons contemplating marriage," retain the term "mar-
riage contract." Historically, prospective spouses have used these lat-
ter articles as authority for donations to one another of property com-
ing into existence during the marriage. 2 The 1979 revision-makes it
unclear whether spouses may take advantage of these donation ar-
ticles during marriage or may do so only prior to marriage."
6. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2325.
7. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2328.
8. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2424, repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, S 1.
9. 1979 La. Acts, No. 709.
10. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329.
11. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 1734-1755.
12. In Succession of McCloskey, 29 La. Ann. 237 (1877), the court interpreted a
clause in a marriage contract which stated:
Fourth-In consideration of the marriage, and of the love and affection which
the said future husband bears to his said future wife, he does by these presents
donate to his said intended wife the sum of $10,000 (ten thousand dollars), in the
event that she should survive him, said sum to be taken from the mass of his
succession.
This clause was found to be a disposition of future property to take effect at the
death of the donor, making the donee a creditor of the estate and entitling her to
be paid in preference to the legatees. See also Fabre v. Sparks, 12 Rob. 31 (La. 1845);
Criswell v. Seay, 19 La. 528 (1841); Fowler v. Boyd, 15 La. 562 (1840).
13. As is pointed out in the comments, the term "marriage contract" historically
has referred to antenuptial agreements. Arguably, the legislature intended to limit
these donations to antenuptial matrimonial agreements. The comments to articles 2328
and 2329 support this inference. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2328, comment (c) & 2329, comment
(c). The comments, however, do not necessarily reflect the intent of the legislature
and are not law. 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, S 7 (comments are not part of the law and
are not enacted into law by their inclusion in the Act). The picture is clouded by the
simultaneous amendment of article 1888, which had allowed future successions to be
the object of a marriage contract. The amendment deleted the term "marriage con-
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A second problem concerning the definition of matrimonial agree-
ment is the requirement of judicial approval. Spouses entering into
a matrimonial agreement during the marriage must obtain judicial
approval as a formal requisite for the validity of their agreement,
while other agreements between spouses do not require such
approval.'4 Judicial approval, of necessity, will require expenditures
by the spouses of their time and money, and some may well perceive
the requirement as an intrusion of the state into their private affairs.
The legislation does not provide a distinction as to the substance of
these two types of contracts; it provides only for different effects.
One possible way to distinguish between the two is by taking a func-
tional approach. As a starting point of the analysis, it is suggested
that a matrimonial agreement normally regulates future marital
property'5 while an interspousal contract most often governs presently
tract" and substituted "antenuptial agreement." LA. CIv. CODE art. 1888, as amended
by 1979 La. Acts, No. 711.
Several inferences arise from these modifications of the Civil Code articles. First,
by specifically amending article 1888 and by not amending the articles on donations,
the legislature may have intended to change the law regarding the latter. Arguably,
and despite the assertions of the comments, the legislature may have intended that
"marriage contract" be synonymous with "matrimonial agreement." Thus, in order to
continue to limit the donation of a future succession to only those persons contemplating
marriage, the broad class of matrimonial agreements was narrowed by the qualifier
"antenuptial" and the restrictive phrase "antenuptial agreement" was substituted for
"marriage contract." By failing to make a comparable change in the interspousal dona-
tion articles, the legislature arguably intended to change the law therein to permit
such donations during marriage, as well as prior to its celebration. Two contrary in-
ferences also arise. The legislature failed to amend articles 1734-1755 because its in-
tention was that the law would remain the same. This argument would render the
amendment to article 1888 superfluous. The second inference is that although the
legislature intended to keep the law the same, when it amended article 1888 to effec-
tuate that intention, it failed to amend articles 1734-1755 through oversight.
14. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2329. Spouses moving into the state have one year to confect
a matrimonial agreement without the requirement of judicial approval. The require-
ment of judicial approval is discussed more fully in Spaht and Samuel, Equal Manage-
ment Revisited: 1979 Legislative Modifications of the 1978 Matrimonial Regimes Law,
40 LA. L. REV. 83, 90-102 (1979). See Pascal, Updating Louisiana's Community of Gains,
49 TUL. L. REV. 555 (1975). Whether article 2329 is mandatory, as assumed arguendo in
the following text, or is suppletive, is discussed at notes 32-43, infra, and accompany-
ing text.
15. Future things may be the object of an obligation. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1887. A
future succession may only be the object of an antenuptial matrimonial agreement.
LA. CIv. CODE art. 1888. See Alexander v. Gray, 181 So. 639 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938). The
sole condition placed on this general rule is that the future thing must be possible;
if the thing never comes into existence, the obligation lacks an object and is not form-
ed. 2 M. PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 1, no. 1008 at 580 (11th ed. La. St. L. Inst.
trans. 1959). In the absence of an express intent to the contrary, the sale of a specific
future thing is not immediately translative of ownership. See Plaquemine Equip. &
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owned property16 - although some categories of agreements pertaining
to presently owned property are also properly the subject of a
matrimonial agreement.
Interspousal contracts, which the legislation makes clear are not
matrimonial agreements needing judicial approval, contemplate as their
subject matter already-acquired property,"7 for example, a donation
by a spouse of an undivided interest in a community thing to the
other spouse,"8 a gratuitous or onerous transformation of separate prop-
erty into community property, 9 and an amicable partition of the
community.' The same is true with other interspousal contracts that
result from the new freedom to contract;" spouses will be permitted
to lease property to each other, to enter into partnerships, to enter
into loan agreements, to create encumbrances, to secure repayment
when one spouse advances funds to the other,2 to employ each other,
and to enter into compromise agreements.'
When the provisions of an agreement alter the regime but fail
to fit within a specific category of interspousal contract, the proi-
Mach. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 245 La. 201, 157 So. 2d 884 (1963). Ownership is not
transferred until the future thing comes into existence. 2 S. LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS
S 32 in 7 LoUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 48-50 (1975).
16. The wording of the legislation and the comments lead to this distinction be-
tween future and present property. A matrimonial agreement under the legislation
is a "contract establishing " a "system of principles and rules" governing the owner-
ship and management of marital property. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2325 & 2328 (emphasis
added). The words "establishing" and "system" suggest the agreement contemplates
an ongoing regulation of property as it comes into existence, rather than a one-time
division of present marital property. To establish is to "found, to create, to regulate;
[tjo bring about or into existence." A system is an "[oirderly combination or arrange-
ment, as of particulars, parts, or elements into a whole; especially such combination
according to some rational principle. Any methodic arrangement of parts." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 490, 1300 (5th ed. 1979). Comment (d) to article 2330 recognizes that a
contract specifying the division, ownership, or management of future marital property
is a matrimonial regime. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2325 & 2328.
17. Comment (b) to article 2834 (Act 627 of 1978) authorized retroactive provi-
sions in a matrimonial regime contract as long as these provisions did not prejudice
third parties; Act 709 of 1979 did not contain such authorization. The omission does
not mean necessarily that spouses are prohibited from contracting as to already-acquired
property. The comments in Act 709 of 1979 are broader than those of Act 627 and
can be interpreted to include already-acquired property.
18. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2343.
19. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2343.1 (added by 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, S 1).
20. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2336.
21. LA. Clv. CODE art. 1790.
22. See Bilbe, "Management" of Community Assets Under Act 627, 39 LA. L. REV.
409, 436-37 (1979).
23. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329, comment (a).
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sions' subject matter is more properly that of a matrimonial agree-
ment. For example, a matrimonial agreement might include provisions
for apportioning presently owned community property according to
unequal fixed shares, for determining whether existing property should
be subject to the matrimonial regime, and for the reservation of fruits
as separate property of the other spouse.' Thus, a matrimonial agree-
ment regulates future marital property and any division of present
property not covered by a recognized category of interspousal con-
tract, while an interspousal contract concerns presently owned prop-
erty which is the subject of a contract falling within a recognized
category of interspousal dealings.
General Policies
The spouses' ability to contract during marriage, whether by
matrimonial agreement or by interspousal contract, gives them a flex-
ibility never before available in Louisiana.' But Louisiana is not alone
in its approach; in other legal systems which have adopted the com-
munity property regime, the general trend has been to give the
spouses increasing freedom to contract a regime. ' Allowing modifica-
tion of the regime during marriage can be advantageous for a number
of reasons -to utilize as an estate planning tool," to replace what has
become an unfavorable system, to reflect changes resulting from the
birth and growth of children, to reflect changes in wealth, etc.28
Once the decision is made to change the regime, how it is to be
modified becomes important. Individual interspousal contracts may not
provide sufficient flexibility to take into account present and future
changes in the family or in the property of the spouses, while a
matrimonial agreement (a system of rules and principles) may do so.
To confect one agreement regulating present and future property divi-
sion is more efficient than to confect a new interspousal contract for
each situation as it arises. A matrimonial agreement, by eliminating
the need for periodic renegotiation, provides more certainty and pre-
24. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2330, comment (d).
25. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2329, repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, S 1 (a spouse could
not alter the matrimonial agreement during marriage).
26. See 3 M. PLANIOL, supra note 15, at pt. 1, no. 814A at 34. See generally Bartke,
The Reform of the Community Property System of Louisiana-A Response To Its Critics,
54 TUL. L. REV. 294 (1980); Glendon, Power and Authority in the Family: New Legal Pat-
terns as Reflections of Changing Ideologies, 23 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (1975).
27. Bartke, supra note 26, at 301. The new revision of Louisiana successions law,
1981 La. Acts 911 & 919 (providing for different devolution of property depending
on its status as community or separate), may also be an impetus to the execution
of a matrimonial agreement.
28. See Bilbe, supra note 22, at 436-37.
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dictability of property division than would a series of interspousal
contracts.
Spouses who believe that the requirement of judicial approval of
all postnuptial matrimonial agreements is an undesirable intrusion in-
to their private affairs may attempt to minimize judicial involvement
by initially contracting a regime containing a mechanism to change
it. They could, for example, include in their original agreement a "ter-
mination" provision and an alternate regime to be adopted upon the
lapse of the original regime. This type of matrimonial agreement could
be entered into either before marriage upon consent of the future
spouses or during marriage by obtaining judicial approval of the agree-
ment. One possibility would be to contract a matrimonial regime that
provides for a successive plan (or successive plans) which comes into
operation automatically upon the happening of a specified condition29
or after a set time period. This type of complex regime would con-
template the occurrence of an event in the future-the birth of a child,
perhaps. A second possibility is to provide an optional alternative
regime; the change could be effective at the option of one or both
spouses. A combination of the two approaches is also possible.
There should be no serious problem with the first approach. No
provision of the Civil Code prevents such conditional obligations. To
the extent one could argue that a successive regime is a new
matrimonial agreement requiring judicial approval, the simple answer
is that there is no new exercise of will by the spouses and thus no
new agreement. If the matrimonial agreement is entered into after
marriage, article 2329 requires the judge to determine whether the
regime is in the best interests of the spouses. The judge would make
this determination by evaluating the original plan in light of the
spouses' best interests and then by evaluating the successive plan
(or plans) in light of possible conditions.
More serious difficulties arise with alternate plans which go into
effect at the will of one or both spouses. The mechanism to trigger
the change could be simply the declaration of one or both spouses,
or such a declaration to be made after the occurrence of an event,
with or without a delay for decision making and consultation with
legal and financial advisors. The plan arising solely at the option of
the spouses may be the most desirable for many because it is the
most flexible; the plan conditioned upon the happening of an event
is still less restrictive than the automatic successive regime. However,




if the rationale behind judicial evaluation of the matrimonial agree-
ment is the disinterested determination of the best interests of the
spouses, a purely optional regime probably would have less chance
of being approved than an automatic successive regime. In the alter-
nate plan which arises solely at the option of the spouses, the judge
has no facts upon which to measure "best interests," since the spouses
are free to decide when and if they will adopt the alternate plan.
On the other hand, an optional plan arising upon the happening of
an event should be less risky. If the event occurs and the spouses
fail to exercise their option, the original plan would still be in effect.
This "minimum" is similar in result to a judge's approval of a simple
matrimonial agreement without alternate provisions. If the spouses
do exercise the option, the result would be the same as a successive
regime." Spouses who want the flexibility of a matrimonial regime
composed of an original plan with an optional plan have the best
chance of approval if the optional plan is conditioned upon the occur-
rence of a specific event and may be adopted only upon the consent
of both after a reasonable delay for decision making. Requiring the
consent of both spouses, rather than the declaration of only one, gives
the less worldly spouse more of a veto power, which can keep the
regime to the "minimum" the judge would have approved without the
alternate plan.
In order for a matrimonial regime composed of an original plan
and a successive or optional alternate plan to be enforceable, the judge
must have the authority to approve this type of regime and there
must be a continuity of the regime between plans. The judge is
authorized to approve a matrimonial agreement if it is in the best
interests of the spouses and they understand its rules and principles."
In order to make his determination, the judge necessarily must look
beyond the facts before him as to the present situation of the spouses;
he must anticipate whether the regime will be effective both now and
in the future. The judge can and should weigh the petitioners' career
and family plans to decide if the contemplated property regime is in
their best interests. By evaluating both the original and the alter-
nate plan in the context of the present and future situations of the
spouses, the judge is making the same type of decision he is authorized
to make when approving a matrimonial agreement without any alter-
nate provisions.
When confecting a matrimonial agreement composed of an original
30. Spouses must still provide for the possibility that the event may fail to occur,
otherwise they risk invalidating the whole agreement.
31. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329.
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plan and an alternate plan, continuity is important. Even if the judge
has the authority to approve complex postnuptial agreements, a break
in continuity caused by the adoption of an optional plan may render
them unenforceable, since this plan arises upon the future consent
of the parties and resembles a "new" agreement; thus it may be
classified as a new regime rather than as part of one, continuous
regime. During that period of time between the two plans, the legal
regime arguably would go into effect, thus perhaps necessitating fur-
ther judicial approval. The spouses may minimize the probability of
judicial intrusion by avoiding the use of words of termination when
providing for the pivotal event which triggers the ensuing alternate
plan, by providing for the original plan to remain in effect until the
new rules become operative and by specifying that the original plan
will continue in effect if the spouses fail to exercise the option.
Prudent planning requires that any matrimonial agreement com-
posed of more than one plan should include a severability clause. If
the alternate plan is not allowed, arguably the whole matrimonial
agreement is invalid due to a failure of cause. Either spouse could
invalidate the agreement by claiming he would not have agreed to
one plan without the other. A severability clause ensures the minimum
agreement to which the spouses are entitled, since they could have
contracted a simple matrimonial regime before marriage and the judge
can always approve a matrimonial agreement without any alternate
provisions. In this way, the spouses can attempt to obtain the max-
imum flexibility the law allows without being penalized for attemp-
ting to exceed the as yet undelimited maximum.
The preceding discussion presumes that the requirement of
judicial approval is mandatory;32 arguably though, the requirement is
suppletive and may be derogated from conventionally.33 Article 2329
states that spouses may modify or terminate a regime "during mar-
riage only upon joint petition and a finding by the court that this
serves their best interests and that they understand the governing
principles and rules."' This language appears to be clear and
unambiguous,35 and the words in their most usual context appear to
32. See text at notes 28-31, supra.
33. See text at notes"37-43, infra, for a possible exception to this requirement.
34. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2329.
35. "If the text is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning must not be
disregarded." LA. CIv. CODE art. 13. "The words of a law generally must be understood
in their most usual context, giving less importance to the rules of grammar than to
the general and popular use of the words." LA. CIv. CODE art. 14. The word "only" is
defined as: "Solely; merely; for no other purpose; at no other time; in no otherwise;
along; of or by itself; without anything more; exclusive; nothing else or more." BLACK'S
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be imperative. Only two exceptions to the requirement of judicial ap-
proval appear in article 2329: spouses moving to Louisiana from
another state have a one year grace period in which to contract a
regime, and spouses may change to the legal regime at any time. These
narrow exceptions support the contention that the article is man-
datory. The presumed legislative intent of this article, that of protec-
ting the less worldly spouse who is unfamiliar with familial property
acquisition and distribution, would be defeated if the other spouse
could avoid the requirement of a judicial determination that the
matrimonial agreement "serves their best interests." 8
However, an argument also can be made that the article is sup-
pletive, despite its apparently restrictive language. Neither the text
nor the comments to the 1979 revision impose any sanctions for the
failure to obtain judicial approval. Yet article 2330, which imposes
substantive limitations on matrimonial agreements, includes a com-
ment which supports the absolute nullity of any derogation from those
limitations by agreement." Similarly, the donation articles contain
limits as to both form and substance." Failure to satisfy either the
formal or substantive requisites renders a donation invalid by express
codal provision." Article 2353 also specifies that an unauthorized alien-
ation of community property is a relative nullity. Article 2329 arguably
falls under the general category of supplemental law since it contains
neither a commentative nor textual directive of absolute nullity when
the parties fail to obtain judicial approval. Another factor supporting
the supplemental character of this requirement is the general trend
of increasing spousal contractual freedom."0 The legislature dropped
the historical bars to interspousal contracting 1 on the assumption that
modern spouses have equal bargaining strength" and can rely on
general contractual enforcement and protective devices to prevent
overreaching. 3 Requiring mandatory judicial approval is inconsistent
LAW DICTIONARY 982 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis added). In Whittaker v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 176
F. 130, 131 (E.D. La. 1910), the court, when construing the word "only" said, "[W]ithout
reference to the lexicographers, the word has a plain, ordinary, common-sense mean-
ing equivalent to 'solely' . . .."
36. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2329.
37. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2330, comment (a).
38. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1493, 1497, 1519-1521, & 1528-1530.
39. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1536 & 1538.
40. See text at note 26, supra.
41. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1790, as amended by 1978 La. Acts, No. 627, S 3 (eliminating
interspousal contractual incapacity). Spouses, whether or not judicially separated, may
sue each other on causes of action arising out of contracts and out of the provisions
of the Civil Code articles on matrimonial regimes. LA. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1980).
42. See text at note 14, supra.
43. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1819-1859.
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with this assumption; article 2329 should not be considered mandatory
absent an express directive. In any event, the question of the man-
datory or suppletive nature of article 2329 warrants further clarifi-
cation by the legislature.
Substantive Limitations on Matrimonial Agreements
Despite the apparently broad contractual freedom given to spouses
confecting a matrimonial agreement, general Civil Code limitations
on contractual freedom still apply," and the spouses, of course, may
not execute an agreement that prejudices the rights of creditors or
forced heirs. A creditor may use three actions to protect his rights:
the revocatory action, the oblique action and the action in declaration
of simulation. 5 Forced heirs also may use the action in declaration
of simulation as well as the rules governing reduction of excessive
donations."
Article 2330 prohibits spouses from contracting a matrimonial
agreement which renounces the marital portion or alters the
established order of succession.47 Spouses also may not limit with
respect to third persons the right that one spouse alone has under
44. For example, spouses may not contract concerning objects contrary to public
policy. LA. CiV. CODE art. 11. A contract waiving alimony pendente lite has been held to
be an absolute nullity, because public policy dictates that the husband should aid and
assist his wife during the existence of the marriage. Holliday v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d
618 (La. 1978). On the other hand, at least one case has held that a waiver of perma-
nent alimony is not contrary to public order, because permanent alimony is merely
a pension given by one spouse to the other after divorce, when there is no longer
a duty to support. Monk v. Monk, 376 So. 2d 552 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979).
45. The revocatory action requires both an actual intent to defraud and an actual
injury to the creditor. The act complained of must be real and not merely a sham.
LA. CIv. CODE arts 1970-1977. The oblique action allows a creditor to assert any right
not merely personal to the debtor. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1990. The action in declaration
of simulation arises whenever "the effects of an apparent act are modified or sup-
pressed by another act which is supposed to remain secret." Litvinoff, The Action In
Declaration of Simulation In Louisiana Law, in ESSAYS ON THE CIVIL LAW OF OBLIGA-
TIONS 139 (J. Daniow ed. 1969). A creditor, by this action, attempts to reveal the actual
transaction evidenced by the true intentions of the parties. This action differs from
the revocatory action in that a mere sham suffices to justify it; an actual intent to
defraud is unnecessary.
46. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1502 & 1754. The meaning of the "indirect" gifts as used in
article 1754 is obscure. Code Napoleon article 1099 (1804), from which this article was
taken verbatim, contained other specific rules on "reduction by children of a previous
marriage of benefits conferred by matrimonial agreements." Spaht & Samuel, supra
note 14, at 97. The benefits conferred by a matrimonial agreement's provisions pro-
bably are the indirect gifts referred to in article 1754, and if excessive, they are mere-
ly reducible, not null. Id. at 98, n.100.
47. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2330.
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the legal regime to obligate the community, or to lease, alienate, or
encumber community things.'8 Although they are free to contract
between themselves as to the management of the community, such
an agreement would have effect only between the spouses. Conversely,
they may stipulate that one spouse has more power to act alone than
the legal regime provides -for example, a stipulation in an agreement
that one spouse has sole management in instances where both spouses
must ordinarily consent. 9 The purpose of the third limitation in arti-
cle 2330 is to assure a third person dealing with one spouse that the
spouse has at least the powers allowed under the legal regime.'
Modifications of the Community Property Regime
The legal regime may be modified by agreement in countless ways,
ranging from minimal changes to drastic deviations bearing little or
no resemblance to the original regime. Spouses may contract to in-
crease or decrease the community assets, to increase or decrease the
community's liability for satisfaction of antenuptial obligations, to
modify the management of the community within the limits allowed
by the legal regime, or to modify the division of the community assets
and obligations upon dissolution.
Modifying the Distribution of Assets: Increasing the Community
A variety of options are available to spouses who wish to increase
the assets of the community by modifying the legal regime,"1 including
conversion of separate property to community or stipulation of a
universal community." Neither technique is very common, for spouses
contracting a regime have a tendency to exclude as much as possible
from the community.53
Conversion is a partial or total transfer of present or future
property. 4 A transfer by one spouse of a thing forming part of his
separate property to community property is now allowed under the
legal regime' and may be the subject of a gratuitous or onerous inter-
48. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2330.
49. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2347.
50. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 14, at 102. Civil Code articles 2345-2346 and
2350-2352 are instances where one spouse alone has the power to obligate the
community.
51. See Note, Interspousal Contracts, 42 LA. L. REV. 727 (1982).
52. See 3 M. PLANIOL, supra note 15, at pt. 1, no. 978 at 129.
53. Id. at no. 980 at 129-30.
54. Id. at no. 979 at 129.
55. 1981 La. Acts, No. 921, S 2 enacted article 2343.1 of the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1870 which provides:
The transfer by a spouse to the other spouse of a thing forming part of his separate
19821
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
spousal contract. The effect of this transfer is that the donor spouse
loses an undivided one-half interest in his property, while the donee
spouse gains an undivided one-half interest in the property. A transfer
of future separate property to community property by a matrimonial
agreement may be onerous or gratuitous. For example, a conversion
might provide that any property acquired by a spouse by inheritance
or donation or any damages or other indemnity awarded to a spouse
would belong to the community.
Although spouses may increase the community by gratuitous or
onerous transfers of future separate property, the process is not
without its difficulties. These transfers are subject to the rules pro-
tecting forced heirs' and creditors.57 The availability of this type of
transfer as to future property also may be limited to premarital
agreements due to the rules governing donations made by marriage
contract.58
The difficulties should be obviated if the conversion is classified
as an exchange. An exchange "is a contract, by which the parties
... give to one another, one thing for another, whatever it be, except
money . . . ."' It is complete upon consent of the parties,"0 and full
ownership is transferred at that time. In the preceding hypothetical
conversion, both spouses presently would be contributing reciprocally
their right to receive future separate property to the community. The
transfer arguably would not be a donation, but rather a type of ex-
change, which would not be subject to any of the restrictions concern-
ing donations of future things."'
Contracting a universal community will also increase the assets
of the community. According to Planiol, this community would be com-
prised of all of the spouses' property interests, real and personal, pre-
sent and future. Only a few assets would remain separate: (1) property
donated or bequeathed to a spouse on the condition that it remain
separate and (2) interests which by their nature are not assignable.
All obligations would be community except those encumbering gifts
or bequests made to the separate property of one spouse. 2
property, with the stipulation that it shall be part of the community, transforms
the thing into community property. As to both movables and immovables, a transfer
by onerous title must be made in writing and a transfer by gratuitous title must
be made by authentic act.
56. See text at note 46, supra.
57. See text at note 45, supra.
58. See text at notes 11-13, supra.
59. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2660.
60. LA. Civ. CODE art. 2661.
61. See text at notes 11-13, supra.
62. See 3 M. PLANIOL, supra note 15, pt. 1, no. 989 at 133 & no. 1127 at 209.
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The French Code Civil and the Draft Civil Code of Quebec both
provide for a universal community as an optional regime. 3 The Quebec
codal provision allows spouses, by marriage contract, to "establish a
universal community of their property, moveable and immovable, pres-
ent and future, of all their present property alone, or of all their
future property alone."64 Spouses are free to change the matrimonial
agreement and regime during marriage as long as the agreement com-
plies with the requisite formalities65 and does not compromise the in-
terest of the family or the rights of creditors.6 The recently enacted
Civil Code of Quebec67 deleted the section entitled "Principal clauses
that may modify the community of moveables and acquests"6 which
contained, among other modifications,69 the articles which provided
for the establishment of a universal community." Presumably, the dele-
tion was not meant to prohibit this type of modification71 but was
simply the result of an effort to make the Code more concise and
flexible.
Louisiana courts have upheld antenuptial matrimonial agreements
establishing a universal community. 2 The availability and utility of
a postnuptial universal community, however, may be limited by the
63. FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 1526 (J. Crabb trans. 1977); QUE. CIv. CODE 1977 Draft,
Book Two, arts. 67, 97 & 215 (Service de traduction, Ministere des Communications
trans. 1977).
64. QUE. Civ. CODE 1977 Draft, Bk. Two, art. 215.
65. QUE. CIv. CODE 1977 Draft, Bk. Two, art. 77.
66. QUE. CIv. CODE 1977 Draft, Bk. Two, arts. 69 & 76.
67. As reported in CIv. CODE. OF QUE. arts. 400-659.
68. QUE. CIv. CODE 1977 Draft, Bk. Two, arts. 206-215.
69. The section includes articles-Which provided for a community reduced to ac-
quests and a community composed of fixed unequal shares.
70. QUE. CIv. CODE 1977 Draft, Bk. Two, art. 215.
71. The chapter covering the articles on matrimonial regimes was reduced from
165 articles in the 1977 Draft to 61 articles in the enacted version. The substance
of the remaining articles is the same with the exception of new articles 470 & 473,
which removed the requirement of court homologation of a change in the matrimonial
agreement during marriage upon a finding that the change did not compromise the
interests of the family or the rights of their creditors, QUE. CIv. CODE 1977 Draft, Bk.
Two, arts. 72 & 76. Spouses are free to make any kind of stipulation in their marriage
contract, "subject to the imperative provisions of law, public order and good morals,"
CIV. CODE OF QUE. art. 463.
72. In Fabre v. Sparks, 12 Rob. 31, 31 (La. 1845), the marriage contract stipulated
that "there shall be community between the parties, which shall comprehend all their
estate, real and personal, present and to come." See also Hanley v. Drumm, 31 La.
Ann. 106 (1879) (all of the property brought in to the marriage-husband's valued at
$20,000 and wife's valued at $4,000- became community; profits were to be distributed
in proportions similar to the amount each invested in the community); Desobry v.
Schlater, 25 La. Ann. 425 (1873) (all property brought into the marriage or falling to
one or both spouses during the marriage became community).
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restrictions on donations of future things.3 If future things may be
donated only by antenuptial agreement, Louisiana spouses contracting
a postnuptial universal community should structure their transaction
as an exchange or limit the composition to all of their present prop-
erty. If donations of future things are in fact limited to an antenup-
tial agreement, the restriction is unfortunately at odds with reality.
Spouses desiring to contract a universal community usually do so later
in their married life when their relationship has matured. 4
Modifying the Distribution of Assets: Decreasing the Community
Agreements between spouses limiting the property comprising the
community are more common than those increasing the community.
One modification of this type is the "community reduced to gains"
in which spouses exclude from the community all property and debts75
acquired prior to the regime and all future acquisitions made with
separate property. The exclusion may be total or partial and of pres-
ent or future property. Community assets thus are reduced to earn-
ings and income from separate property. Under article 106"7 of the
Draft Civil Code of Quebec, spouses may stipulate that there will be
only a community of acquets between them by excluding from the com-
munity all property and debts existing when the regime began and
any future acquisitions deemed private property." At termination, par-
tition is made of community acquets only. 9
73. See text at notes 11-13, supra.
74. See Bartke, supra note 26, at 301.
75. See text at notes 78-86, infra.
76. 3 M. PLANIOL, supra note 15, at pt. 1, no. 992 at 134 & no. 995 at 135. The usual
form of the exclusion clause is that it is mutual and takes in both present and future
interests. Id. at no. 999 at 139.
77. QUE. CIv. CODE 1977 Draft, Bk. Two, art. 206.
78. Private property is defined as:
1. property owned or possessed when the regime comes into effect;
2. property that accures to him during the regime by succession, legacy
or gift, and the fruits and income derived from that property if the
testator or donor has so provided;
3. property acquired by him to replace private property, and any insurance
indemnity relating thereto;
4. the rights or advantages that accrue to him as a contingent owner or
as a beneficiary under a contract or plan for a retirement pension or
other annuity, or for insurance of persons;
5. his clothing, personal linen and papers, wedding ring, decorations and
diplomas;
6. the instruments required for his occupation, saving compensation where
applicable.
CIv. CODE OF QUE. art. 482.
79. QUE. CIV. CODE 1977 Draft, Bk. Two, art. 206.
[Vol. 43
NOTES
Although Louisiana no longer has a specific Code provision for
limited communities created by matrimonial agreements, several Loui-
siana cases treat this issue under prerevision article 2424. The spouses
in Barrow v. Stevens' contracted a modified community which excluded
the income from the wife's plantation. The court held that specifical-
ly excluding the income of the plantation from the community by mar-
riage contract was a permissible modification of the community."
Another permissible modification is found in Clay v. United States,2
in which the community was limited to future acquisitions only; all
income from properties obtained prior to the marriage remained
separate income.83
Another possibility of limiting the community is by restricting
the community to gains only by excluding from the community all
property and income other than the earnings of the spouses. This
restriction should not be contrary to public policy since the articles
allow a complete exclusion of the legal community.' Nor does this
restriction derogate from the prohibition in article 2330, as it does
not limit either spouse's right to obligate the community. It simply
limits the amount of assets comprising the community, a possibility
referred to approvingly in the comment to article 2330.
Although limitations of the community may be accomplished
through the use of matrimonial agreements, the community can in
fact be limited without an agreement. Under the legal regime, a spouse
may limit the community assets without the knowledge of the other
spouse. By making a unilateral declaration, he may classify the in-
come from his separate property as separate85-without this declara-
tion, the income would be community property. Once the declaration
is made, however, any of this income spent on the ordinary and
customary expenses of the marriage may entitle the spouse to a claim
for reimbursement against the other spouse upon termination of the
community.' To avoid reimbursement from separate funds, the non-
80. 27 La. Ann. 343 (1875).
81. Id. at 344. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2424, repeated by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709,
1; LA. CIv. CODE art. 2330, comment (d).
82. 161 F.2d 607 (5th Cir. 1947).
83. Id. at 608. Before article 2424 was repealed, it specifically provided for this
type of modification of the legal community by marriage contract. LA. CIv. CODE art.
2424, (repealed by 1979 La. Acts, No. 709, S 1).
84. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2328, 2356 & 2370-2376.
85. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2339.
86. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2358, 2360 & 2365. See generally Note, Termination of the Com-
munity, 42 LA. L. REV. 789 (1982).
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working spouse who needs assurance that the other spouse will not
make such a declaration should include in the matrimonial agreement
a provision permanently classifying income from separate property
as community property. 7
With equal management,88 each spouse is liable for the debt he
incurs, whether for his separate benefit or for the benefit of the com-
munity. The debt may be satisfied prior to termination of the com-
munity from community property or from the separate property of
the spouse incurring the debt." Even premarital debts can be satisfied
entirely from community property.
This liability of the community probably can be limited by
matrimonial agreement. Article 2330 arguably should not be construed
to prohibit limiting antenuptial creditors' ability to satisfy their debts
from the community property through a separation of debts clause,
for the text of the article is clear-it refers to a "spouse ... under
the legal regime."' Since the parties could have contracted a pure
separate property regime in which the creditors of each spouse could
not have reached into the other's patrimony at all, a modified com-
munity which has the same result with respect to creditors but allows
the spouses to share their resources between themselves likewise
should be permissible. The recorded agreement should give creditors
more than adequate notice.
Indeed, the legal regime has been criticized as being a boon to
creditors by extending the reach of the antenuptial creditor to com-
munity funds. Allowing the creditor to recover from the nonobligor
spouse's one-half of the community, to the extent that it is not
enhanced by property or efforts of the obligor spouse, is subjecting
the property of one person to the satisfaction of an obligation of
another. Also, the creditor probably does not rely on the uncertainty
of his obligor's future marriage plans when he extends credit.9 Fur-
thermore, the policy reasons supporting a prohibition of a separation
of debts clause cannot be very strong if the nonobligor spouse is able
87. Spaht & Samuel, supra note 14, at 95-96. A sample provision might use the
following language: "The following are to fall into the community of gains between
the spouses: the fruits, revenues, and income from each spouse's separate assets."
88. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2346.
89. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2345.
90. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2330 (emphasis added).
91. In order to rely on the marriage of his debtor, the creditor would have to
consider: (1) whether the debtor would marry at all, (2) whether the spouses would
adopt a separation of property regime, and (3) if the spouses fail to adopt a separation




to avoid liability by other means. For example, a spouse may limit
immediate input into the community or limit future contributions to
the community. A spouse also may insist on a separation of property
regime modified to resemble the Quebec model92 and still obtain ap-
proximately the same benefits of the growth of the community and
the obligor spouse's income.
An argument against allowing such separation of debts provisions
does not come from the rights of creditors to reach the community,
for they have no such right. The spouses could specify a complete
separation of property regime, leaving each creditor with no access
to the other spouse's assets. The argument, instead, has to be based
on a possible violation of the provision of article 2330 which prohibits
agreements that would "limit with respect to third persons the right
that one spouse alone has under the legal regime to obligate the
community."93 The phrase "obligate the community" presumably refers
to the power of one spouse to contract debts which are collectible
out of the community property.. However, even if this argument is
accepted, the provision applies by its terms to debts contracted during
the existence of the community; the provision does not extend to debts
contracted before the marriage, and it still ought to be permissible
to limit the access of antenuptial debtors to the community.
However, it is also arguable that the conceptual framework of the
articles governing satisfaction of debts contemplates satisfaction of
antenuptial debts from community property. Article 2363 lists three
kinds of separate obligations categorized according to the time the
obligation is incurred: (1) those incurred prior to the establishment
of the community, (2) those incurred during the community, and (3)
those incurred after the community is terminated.' Implicit in the
structure of article 2357 is that a separate obligation incurred after
the community is terminated cannot be satisfied from the former com-
munity. In that instance, the Code sets up a limitation by exclusion,
which is based on the time the obligation is incurred. 5 Yet article
2345, which allows separate obligations to be satisfied during the com-
munity regime from community property, does not limit separate
obligations as to the time incurred and thus includes both separate
debts incurred during the community and antenuptial debts.
92. See text at notes 140-153, infra.
93. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2330.
94. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2363.
95. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2357. See also Succession.of Acosta, 396 So. 2d 499 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1981) (contracts entered into by a widow after the termination of the com-
munity by the death of one spouse but prior to the settlement of the estate were
separate property of the wife and did not create obligations in favor of the community).
1982]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Behind this statutory authority lies the possibly conflicting policies
of not allowing third parties to become partners in the community
and of assuring that a debtor's property remains the common pledge
of his creditors. The extensive reimbursement articles help align these
two goals by placing the ultimate burden of accounting on the spouses.
Since an undivided one-half of the community belongs to the obligor
spouse,' a clause eliminating the liability of the community for prenup-
tial debts removes this property from the creditor's reach. This type
of limitation on a donation from a stranger would not be effective
as to a nonparty creditor;" and spouses, through a matrimonial agree-
ment, should not be able to circumvent this restriction. On first im-
pression, a clause limiting the liability of the community to the one-
half owned by the obligor would appear to be reasonable. However,
if a creditor attempts to execute on this half of the community or
on a particular community thing, he is prohibited from doing so by
express Code articles. 8 Although spouses may voluntarily partition
the community, they may not judicially partition it during the com-
munity property regime." Nor can a spouse evade the mandate"°° of
article 2337 and alienate his share of the community prior to termina-
tion. The policy behind these articles is to keep strangers from be-
coming partners in the community-a relationship which is far more
personal than a mere partnership or joint ownership. Therefore, a
creditor apparently is unable to execute on the obligor spouse's un-
divided one-half of the community. This result, however, is contrary
to article 3183, which makes the property of the debtor the common
pledge of his creditor. Thus, if a separation of debts clause is allow-
ed, the necessary conclusion is that the legislature intended article
2337 to limit significantly article 3183.
Rather than concluding that the legislature impliedly intended this
result, a better view reconciles article 2337 with article 3183 by allow-
ing an antenuptial creditor to reach all community property by reason
of its "attachment" to the debtor's patrimony. The augmentation of
the debtor spouse's patrimony is no more of a windfall to the creditor
than that which he receives when the debtor unexpectedly comes in-
to a large inheritance. Only by allowing a creditor to reach the whole
interest ip a community thing is it possible to prevent him from be-
coming a partner in the community. The advantage to the debtor
spouse is compensated by rendering the nondebtor spouse a "creditor"
96. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2336.
97. See text at notes 44-45, supra.
98. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2336 & 2337.
99. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2336.
100. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 2337, comment (b).
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within the reimbursement scheme. Thus, a burden is placed upon the
nonobligor spouse to ascertain the credit status of the other spouse.
Placing the burden on the spouses is more reasonable than allowing
the creditor to interfere in the community. Although a separation of
debts clause appears to be prohibited, a nondebtor spouse has other
means of protection, provided the spouses are willing to forego
whatever benefits the community may proffer, by adopting a separa-
tion of property regime. If this protective measure is taken, the
creditor will suffer a corresponding loss of ability to reach the prop-
erty of the nondebtor spouse.
Modification of Community Management
Under the legal regime, both spouses acting alone have equal
management capacity.01 As an exception, a spouse is given exclusive
management authority over the movable assets of a community
business he alone manages,102 over movables issued or registered in
his name only,'0 3 and over his interest in a partnership." Also, con-
currence of both spouses is required to alienate, lease, or encumber
community immovables, furniture located in the family home, all or
substantially all of the assets of a community enterprise, and com-
munity movables registered in both spouses' names.' 5 The donation
of community property to a third person, other than a usual or
customary gift, also requires concurrence of both spouses.'
Attempts to change these powers by matrimonial agreement are
limited by article 2330, which prohibits a modified community which
limits with respect to third persons "the right that one spouse alone
has under the legal regime to obligate the community or to alienate,
encumber, or lease community property." However, the concurrence
requirements may be altered by a matrimonial agreement without
violating article 2330's prohibitions. Because the joint management
provisions are not instances in which one spouse alone has any power,
a spouse who alters his right to concur does not limit the ability,
with respect to third persons, that he alone has to alienate, encumber,
or lease community property. On the contrary, the other spouse ob-
tains more power to act alone than the legal regime gives him.' 7
101. See generally, Note, Management of Community Assets: Incorporeal Movables,
42 LA. L. REV. 770 (1982).
102. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2350.
103. LA. CiV. CODE art. 2351.
104. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2352.
105. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2347.
106. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2349.
107. See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 14 at 103.
19821
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The ability of a spouse to alter his right to concur may be limited
by article 2348. This article gives a spouse the power expressly to
renounce the right to concur as to: (1) the alienation, lease, or encum-
brance of some or all of the community immovables, (2) the aliena-
tion, lease, or encumbrance of all of a community enterprise, and (3)
participation in the management of a community enterprise. Because
this listing is not coextensive with article 2347's enumeration of the
instances where concurrence is required, dual management may be
required for the alienation, lease, or encumbrance of furniture or fur-
nishings while located in the family home and for movables registered
jointly in the spouses' names. The rationale behind the requirement
of dual management of these assets could be due to their extremely
mobile character. However, a more likely reconciliation of the articles
is that article 2348's enumeration of permitted unilateral renuncia-
tions of the right to concur does not limit the more general ability
to avoid such requirements by matrimonial agreements to which both
parties consent. As a matter of basic policy, it is hard to understand
why one should be able to renounce the right to concur in the aliena-
tion of a valuable immovable, but not with respect to an old couch.
Modifications of the Rules Governing Termination of the Community
Although the usual rule at dissolution is to divide the community
equally, a matrimonial agreement may provide for ownership of the
community in other portions upon dissolution of the community by
death.0 8 The purpose of this type of stipulation is to favor the survi-
ving spouse, and it is made usually on the condition that there be
no children of the marriage"9 or on the condition that the allocation
will not impinge on the legitime. Such a stipulation would be subject
to the rights of creditors and could be attacked as an indirect dona-
tion or as a contract in fraud of creditors.1
Spouses also may want to alter the provisions concerning reim-
bursement for community funds used for the acquisition, use, improve-
ment, or benefit of separate property or used to pay separate debts
108. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2330, comment (d). See generally Note, Termination of the Com-
munity, 42 LA. L. REV. 789 (1982).
109. See 3 M. PLANIOL, supra note 15, at pt. 1, no. 1311 at 302. See also Fabre v.
Sparks, 12 Rob. 31 (La. 1845); Criswell v. Seay, 19 La. 528 (1841); Parquin v. Finch,
1 Mart. (La.) 465 (La. 1823).
110. See text at note 45, supra. Two possible classes of creditors can sue to annul
the contract-those whose rights arise before the agreement is executed and those
whose rights arise before dissolution. Arguably, any predissolution creditor should be
able to annul this contract. This type of contract is subject to a suspensive condition
(death of the spouse), and creditors are not actually prejudiced until the happening
of the condition-dissolution by death.
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of the other spouse."' Under the legal regime, the measure of com-
pensation is one-half the amount or value of the community property
used unless the increase in value was due to the uncompensated labor
of either spouse, in which case the other spouse is entitled to one-
half the increase in value.' 2 In an inflationary time, this type of com-
pensation often results in a transfer of wealth to the owner of the
separate asset because the community is being reimbursed with in-
flated dollars. Even if the amount of community property used is com-
puted in inflation-adjusted dollars, the increase in value of the separate
asset may be far greater than the sum of money expended. To pre-
vent the possibility of augmenting the separate property of one spouse
in times of inflation, the spouses could provide in a matrimonial agree-
ment that the increase in value of the separate property adjusted
for inflation will be the measure of recovery upon termination."3
In some instances, spouses may want to waive any claim to reim-
bursement, by a clause in their matrimonial agreement. For example,
a wealthy spouse might want to pay for all the expenses of the mar-
riage from his separate property and might not want the poorer spouse
to face a claim for reimbursement. Although creditors of the wealthy
spouse at dissolution might attack such a waiver by the use of a
revocatory action,"' it is doubtful the rights of the creditors would
have been prejudiced. Had no waiver been in the matrimonial agree-
ment, the spouse could have refused to exercise his right to reim-
bursement. If the spouse so elected, the creditors' only remedy would
be to use the oblique action"'-whereby the creditors would exercise
the nonpersonal"' right which the spouse refused to exercise. Whether
the right to reimbursement is personal to the debtor is not settled.
However, according to article 1991, a creditor may not require the
separation of property between husband and wife, make their debtor
accept a donation inter vivos, or call for a coheir of the debtor to
collate, as these rights are personal to the debtor."' The policy behind
the article seems to be that of keeping third parties from interfering
in the family unit. Because forcing a spouse to demand reimburse-
ment arguably is as personal to the debtor as the examples cited in
article 1991, the policy of promoting family harmony would be fur-
111. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2358, 2364 & 2366.
112. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2358 & 2364-2368.
113. See Bartke, supra note 26, at 329; Spaht & Samuel, supra note 14, at 142 (the
advance is treated as an interest-free loan, rather than as an investment; risk of loss
is eliminated, as is the risk of gain).
114. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1968-1994. See text at note 45, supra.
115. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1990.
116. See text at note 45, supra.
117. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1991.
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thered by characterizing the right to claim reimbursement as personal
to the debtor, thus precluding a successful oblique action by the
creditor. Furthermore, the comment to article 2358 states that the
articles governing claims for reimbursement are applicable only
between the spouses and their universal successors.118 Perhaps this
comment indicates that the right to reimbursement is to be considered
personal to the spouses, since a universal successor "represents the
person of the deceased, and succeeds to all his rights and charges. 119
If this right is considered personal to the debtor, the oblique action
cannot be used by the creditor. The spouse furthermore can use the
same argument to thwart the revocatory action when there is a waiver
provision in the matrimonial agreement. Although the personal
character of the right is irrelevant in a revocatory action, the spouse
can argue that the creditor was not prejudiced-an essential element
for a successful revocatory action.12 Since the creditor has no remedy
when there is a refusal to exercise the right, the waiver of this right
in a matrimonial agreement could not be said to prejudice the
creditor's rights.
Separation of Property Regimes
Articles 2370-2376 of the Civil Code provide the rules for a regime
of separation of property. This type of regime may be desirable for
several reasons. Through the use of the legal regime, spouses may
not be able to achieve the management scheme they want due to the
limitation of article 2330; 121 similarly, spouses who wish to limit the
liability of the community for premarital debts'2 2 may want to do so
through a separation of property regime. If, in their matrimonial
agreement, '23 the spouses simply establish a regime of separation of
property without further provisions, the codal scheme of articles
2370-2376 will be in effect. In this scheme, ownership of all property
is separate. Each spouse has the "sole" '24 management of his property
without the need for the concurrence or consent of the other spouse.125
Each spouse is solidarily liable for necessaries for himself and the
118. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2358, comment.
119. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3556 (28).
120. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1969.
121. See text at notes 44-50, supra.
122. See text at notes 47-50, supra.
123. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2370. The separation of property regime must be created by
a matrimonial agreement or must result from a judgment of separation in order to
be effective.
124. This aspect contrasts sharply with the legal regime which provides for sole
(arts. 2348, 2350, 2351 & 2352), equal (art. 2346), and joint management (art. 2347).
125. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2371.
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family 126 and is proportionately liable for expenses of the marriage,
according to his means.127 If the debt is neither an expense of the
marriage nor a "necessary," the obligor spouse is solely liable. Also,
spouses who adopt a regime of separation of property, rather than
the legal regime, will be making a significant change in the area of
intestate succession, as separate property devolves differently than
does community property.'28 If the spouses are separate in property
and one spouse is adjudicated a bankrupt, the creditors of the
bankrupt spouse will not be able to reach the property of the other
spouse; they could have reached it, however, had the spouses been
living in community.29
Some spouses may want to avoid the automatic consequences of
the codal separation of property scheme yet retain the flexibility not
afforded by a simple modifiction of the legal regime due to the limita-
tion imposed by article 2330. If a spouse wants a type of exclusive
management of the assets he acquires but is not willing to eliminate
the advantages of community property ownership, alteration of the
separation of property regime may provide a possible solution. 13 A
modified separation of property regime may be particularly beneficial
for the "traditional" family in which one spouse is the sole wage earner
and acquirer of property and one spouse works in the home for no
compensation, as well as for the "two-income" family in which both
spouses earn and acquire property. The "traditional" couple may want
to contract a modified separation of property regime for several
reasons. The assets acquired by the wage-earning spouse would re-
main in the patrimony of the acquiring spouse subject to this exclusive
126. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2372.
127. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2373. The matrimonial agreement may specify the relative
contributions of the spouses to the expenses of the marriage. Contributions may be
made, for example, on a percentage basis or on a class of debts basis.
128. If there are no children of the marriage, separate property of the deceased
passes to his brothers and sisters or their descendants subject to a usufruct in favor
of the surviving parent or parents. The surviving spouse succeeds to the property
only if there are no children of the marriage, or brothers and sisters or their
descendents, or parents of thedeceased. On the other hand, community property passes
to the surviving spouse if there are no descendants. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 889-894.
129. See Pedlar, Community Property and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11
ST. MARY'S L.J. 349, 357-358, (1979).
130. It is important to refer to this regime as a modification of the separation
of property regime to avoid the operation of article 2330-which would be implicated
if the agreement is classified as a modification of the legal regime. Prudence might
also dictate including the following provision: "This agreement shall be governed only
by the separation of property articles, subject to any modifications and additions in-
cluded in this instrument. The rules governing the legal regime of community property
shall not apply, and are hereby wholly excluded to the extent allowed by law."
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control and management. Creditors of the nonwage-earning spouse
would not be able to seize the assets acquired by the wage-earning
spouse. Upon termination, the nonwage-earning spouse would have
the opportunity to accept or reject partition of the marital assets which
has been subject to sole management by the acquiring spouse. A "two-
income" family may be desirous of a regime that allows separate, ex-
clusive management by each spouse of the assets he acquires during
the marriage, yet which also provides the ultimate advantages of co-
ownership, e.g., partition and distribution of assets upon termination. 3'
Since spouses are allowed to deviate so drastically from the pro-
visions of the legal regime, and but for the limitation of article 2330
could reach a regime similar to the modified separation of property
regime, it seems that they should also be able to deviate, by
matrimonial agreement, from the provisions of the codal separation
of property regime. The text of article 2328 implies that spouses have
this ability. That article gives spouses the power to "establish by
matrimonial agreement a regime of separation of property" or to
"modify the legal regime." ' 2 In the phrase "a regime of separation
of property," the word "a" implies there may be more than one type
of separation of property regime. On the other hand, in the phrase
"the legal regime," the word "the" implies there is only one legal
regime. The spirit of the legislation is to allow the fullest freedom
to modify agreements as to their content, within the limits prescribed
by public policy. For these reasons, spouses should be able to modify
the codal separation of property regime in order to provide for their
needs.
Such modifications may be limited by the rules governing
necessaries' and expenses of the marriage.3' Article 2372 makes the
spouses solidarily liable for an obligation incurred for necessaries. This
solidary liability applies only as to third parties; between themselves,
the spouses may apportion the debt according to their matrimonial
agreement, or in the absence of such a provision, according to their
means.' Although spouses may modify this solidary liability for
necessaries between themselves, they may not alter it as to third par-
ties by renouncing one spouse's solidary liability with the other spouse.
Even though the comments to article 2372 do not characterize the
131. See text at notes 160-163, infra.
132. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2328 (emphasis added).
133. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2372.
134. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2373.
135. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2372, comment (a), & 2373. Necessaries are a subset of the
category of expenses of the marriage, and therefore spouses may apportion payment
for these necessaries among themselves.
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article as a rule of public order, its source is French Civil Code article
220 which makes solidary liability for necessaries a matter of public
order."3
Article 2373 allows apportionment between the spouses as to the
expenses of the marriage. This allocation can be accomplished by a
specific stipulation as to particular expenses or by a pro rata con-
tribution to the expenses of the marriage. In the absence of such pro-
visions, the expenses of the marriage will be borne according to the
means of the spouses. 37 A spouse's responsibility allocated by appor-
tioning necessaries or the expenses of the marriage may not fall below
the level of mutual support imposed by article 119."'
Possible Models for a Modified Separation of Property Regime
The general trend in most community property jurisdictions has
been to give the spouses more flexibility in choosing a matrimonial
property regime.13 Several of these jurisdictions, including Louisiana,
recently have rewritten their matrimonial regimes law, making their
legal regimes more liberal and giving spouses more freedom to con-
tract their own regime. Some of these legal regimes may be used
as models for possible modifications of the codal separation of pro-
perty regime. They offer these attractive features: (1) each spouse
has exclusive management over the property he acquires, and (2) the
advantage of co-ownership of property acquired by either spouse is
retained. The following discussion will focus on two possible models,
the Quebec partnership of acquests " ° and the 1977 proposal by the
Louisiana Law Institute."'
The legal regime of Quebec, sometimes referred to as a "defer-
red community," is the partnership of acquests. All marital property
136. See Spaht & Samuel, supra note 14, at 105. The French Civil Code, however,
circumscribes this joint obligation. The limitation does not apply for
expenditures manifestly excessive, with regard to the way of life of the household,
to the utility or inutility of the transaction, to the good or bad faith of the con-
tracting third party. It does not hold either for obligations resulting from install-
ment purchases if they have not been concluded with the consent of the two
spouses.
FRENCH CIv. CODE art. 220 (J. Crabb trans. 1977).
137. This is a change in the law. Prior to the enactment of the "equal manage-
ment" regime, the measure of contribution in the absence of an agreement was up
to one-half of the income of the wife. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2395 (repealed by 1979 La. Acts,
No. 709, S 1).
138. The spouses owe each other mutually, fidelity, support, and assistance. LA.
CIv. CODE art. 119.
139. See text at 25-26, supra.
140. CIv. CODE OF QUE. arts. 480-517.
141. La. H.B. 783, Reg. Sess. (1977).
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is divided into private property and acquests,' 2 with a presumption
that property acquired during the existence of the regime is an
acquest.' 3 Acquests include all property not declared to be private
property, proceeds of work of the spouse during the regime, fruits
and income of all private property or acquests, any monetary benefits
from disability allowances, support judgments, retirement pensions,
and annuities, and proceeds or income arising from intellectual and
industrial property rights.44 Private property is analogous to our
separate property. Each spouse freely holds and manages his private
property and any acquests he may acquire during the regime,'" with
the exception that concurrence of the spouses is required in order
to dispose of acquests inter vivos other than modest amounts or
customary gifts.'46 During the existence of the regime, each spouse
is solely liable, out of his acquests and private property, for all debts
he incurred either during or prior to the existence of the regime. The
spouse is not liable for the debts of the other spouse while the regime
exists. 47
After termination and partition, a creditor of one spouse may sue
the nondebtor spouse, but only to the extent of the benefit derived
by him. 48 Upon termination of the regime, each spouse retains his
private property and has the opportunity to accept or renounce the
partition of the acquests of the other spouse.'49 If a spouse renounces
his right to a partition, his creditors may attack the renunciation as
being prejudicial to their rights and may accept the share of the spouse
to the extent of their claim."0 On the other hand, if the partition of
the spouse's acquests is accepted, the patrimony of the partitioning
spouse is divided into two masses: one comprising the private prop-
erty and the other the acquests.'' A statement is compiled of the
compensation owed by one mass to the other, e.g., reimbursement for
certain debts paid with separate funds, or for private property enhanc-
ed through the use of acquests."5 Once this settlement is completed,
142. CIv. CODE OF QUE art. 480.
143. CIv. CODE OF QUE. art. 481.
144. CiV. CODE OF QUE. arts. 481, 485 & 490.
145. CIv. CODE OF QUE. art. 493.
146. CIV. CODE OF QUE. art. 494.
147. CIv. CODE OF QUE. art. 496.
148. CIV. CODE OF QUE. art. 517. The spouse has recourse against the other for one-
half of the sums that he has been forced to pay.
149. CIv. CODE OF QUE. art. 499.
150. CIV. CODE OF QUE. art. 502.
151. CIv. CODE OF QUE. art. 507.
152. CIV. CODE OF QUE. arts. 483, 484 & 508. The compensation is measured by the
enrichment of one mass to the detriment of the other, as of the day the regime dissolves.
CIv. CODE OF QUE. art. 509.
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the mass of acquests is divided equally between the spouses.'"
The proposal of the Louisiana Law Institute differs from the
Quebec model mainly in its management and dissolution provisions.
The classification of assets is similar: separate property is analogous
to private property and community property is analogous to acquests.
The Louisiana model also classifies as separate property minerals pro-
duced from separate property and revenues derived from mineral
rights in separate property.'" In addition, spouses are able to file an
act declaring that all income from separate property be classified per-
manently as separate, rather than community. 55 Community property
is treated similar to the Quebec system with the exception that the
Louisiana model categorizes damages received in a personal injury
award for loss of earnings during the community regime as community
property."
The major difference between the two systems is the manner in
which property is managed. Each spouse has the right to possess,
manage, alienate, and encumber all things produced by his individual
effort, skill, or industry, whereas, either spouse may do so with things,
produced by joint effort. Thus each spouse manages his own separate
property and has sole management over part of the community, while
leaving a part of the community to be managed jointly."7 A spouse's
liability for his debts can be satisfied out of his separate property,
which is, with respect to community property, that portion under his
sole administration, or with respect to joint community property, only
that portion administered by the debtor spouse.'58
Upon dissolution, as in the Quebec model, a Louisiana spouse has
the opportunity to accept or renounce the partition of the community
assets administered by the other spouse." The renouncing spouse is
not liable for the debts of the other spouse, provided the renouncing
spouse is not otherwise responsible for them. Nor does the renuncia-
tion impair the undivided interest of the renouncing spouse in the
community property under his sole administration. A spouse may ac-
cept the partition in one of two ways. He may accept simply and
153. Civ. CODE OF QUE. arts. 513 & 514.
154. La. H.B. 783, S 2838 (7), Reg. Sess. (1977).
155. Id. S 2838 (5).
156. Id. S 2839.
157. Id. S 2841. The portion of the community subject to joint management arguably
would be fairly small, if it exists at all; most community assets come from wages of
the spouse, which would fall into the part of the community subject to his sole ad-
ministration. Spouses who are partners in a business, on the other hand, would have
the largest portion of their community subject to the control of either.
158. Id. S 2847.
159. Id. S 2853.
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become personally liable for his portion of the debts incurred by the
other spouse for their common interest. Or he may accept with benefit
of inventory, in which case he is liable for the debts incurred by the
other for the common interests of the spouses, but only to the extent
of the value of his portion of the community property administered
by the debtor spouse. Thus if the debts incurred by one spouse are
greater than the undivided interest of the nondebtor spouse, the
separate property and the community property the nondebtor spouse
administers will not be subject to seizure by creditors of the debtor
spouse. Such a contractual regime should not run afoul of the provi-
sions of article 2330 prohibiting agreements that limit one spouse's
rights to manage community assets, for there simply is no community
to manage. A deferred sharing arrangement does not provide for a
present undivided interest in the assets, which is seemingly a requisite
for community property under article 2336.
A modified separation of property regime may be preferred to
the legal regime in both the "traditional" family and the "two-income"
family described previously1 O Under the Quebec model,"6' in the "tradi-
tional" family in which the wife works in the home and the husband
is the sole wage earner, the husband is the sole acquirer of assets.
Since these assets form part of his patrimony, he has sole control
over most of the marital assets. The wife manages the home, and the
ordinary expenses of the marriage are divided according to the
spouses' matrimonial agreement. As the marital assets are in the
patrimony of the wage-earning spouse, separate creditors of the wife
cannot seize the assets of the marriage. The husband's creditors,
however, can attack the marital assets and the husband's private pro-
perty in order to satisfy the husband's separate debts. If the debt
is one for necessaries, the creditor can satisfy the debt from the
marital assets and the private property of both spouses. The marital
assets in the husband's patrimony are divided equally upon dissolu-
tion if the wife chooses to accept the partition. Thus, the wife who
works in the home is assured of an eventual ownership interest. This
type of regime is similar to the old "head and master" regime as long
as the wife has no income. If she chooses to earn an income or receives
any income from her private property, the assets become part of her
patrimony subject to her sole management.
The "two-funds" model proposed by the Louisiana Law Institute..2
would be substantially similar to the Quebec model in both arrange-
160. See text at notes 130-131, supra.
161. See text at notes 139-153, supra.
162. See text at notes 154-159, supra.
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ment and effect. To lessen confusion and to avoid any potential prob-
lems caused by the prohibition of article 2330,6' spouses should
establish clearly that they are not creating a community. Thus, each
spouse will have sole management of the assets he acquires during
the marriage and both can manage any assets they acquire jointly.
One advantage of this model over that of Quebec is acceptance of
a partition with the benefit of inventory. In such a case, although
the spouse has accepted the partition of assets managed solely by
the other spouse, the accepting spouse is liable only for the debts
incurred by the other spouse up to the amount the accepting spouse
will receive through partition. A disadvantage of this model is that
the joint assets managed by both spouses may be seized by the
creditors of either spouse. Therefore, if the spouses have substantial
joint assets and one spouse has many premarital creditors, the spouses
may better protect the assets of the marriage by using the Quebec
model. On the other hand, the "two-funds" system may be advan-
tageous for spouses who have received or anticipate receiving joint
donations or inheritances. The asset simply will fall into the jointly
managed fund, thus avoiding uncertainty of decision concerning alloca-
tion of the sum between the spouses. Sole management by one spouse
of the assets of the marriage may be a desirable goal, especially if
the other spouse is physically or mentally incapacitated.
The modified separation of property regime also may provide a
flexible alternative regime for the "two-income" family previously
discussed. Under the Quebec model, each spouse acquires assets which
become part of his own patrimony. His premarital and marital
creditors can seize his private property and the marital assets in his
patrimony to satisfy his obligations. Upon termination of the regime,
each spouse has the opportunity to accept or renounce the partition
of the marital assets managed by the other spouse. This system dif-
fers from the legal regime, for each spouse solely administers and
manages the assets he brings into the marriage. In addition, creditors
of one spouse cannot reach the private property or the marital assets
of the other spouse prior to termination of the regime. This system
differs from a separation of property regime by allowing partition of
the marital assets upon dissolution of the regime. The two-fund model
of the Louisiana Law Institute differs in the ways discussed previously.
Both spouses have the ability to accept a partition with benefit of
inventory, which may be beneficial if a spouse has incurred a substan-
tial number of debts and his income is not sufficient to meet the obliga-
tions. Also, creditors of either spouse can reach the jointly managed
163. See text at notes 47-50, supra.
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fund of marital assets. The two-fund model may be a desirable model
for spouses who work together as co-owners of a family business
because the jointly produced income would fall into a jointly managed
fund.
Conclusion
Despite the "comprehensive" revision of the matrimonial regimes
law, some areas of community property law still need attention. A
matrimonial agreement is a useful device to avoid these potential prob-
lem areas. A well-written matrimonial agreement can provide an alter-
native to the legal regime, whether it be a simple modification, or
a total exclusion of the legal regime. The matrimonial agreement pro-
visions suggested in this article are not, however, the only solutions.
These proposals are simply examples of the vast number of possible
contractual modifications which may be used to tailor a regime to a
couple's needs and which explore the limitations on creative contrac-
ting by spouses.
Laura Schofield Bailey
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